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Abstract
Malware creators have been getting their way for too
long now. String-based similarity measures can leverage
ground truth in a scalable way and can operate at a level
of abstraction that is difficult to combat from the code
level. We introduce ITect, a scalable approach to malware
similarity detection based on information theory. ITect
targets file entropy patterns in different ways to achieve
100% precision with 90% accuracy but it could target
100% recall instead. It outperforms VirusTotal for preci-
sion and accuracy on combined Kaggle and VirusShare
malware.
1 Introduction
The number of new variants of malware is increasing at
a prodigious rate. These are cheap to manufacture using
polymorphic and metamorphic engines. 2014 saw over
317 million new malware variants, an increase of 26%
over 2013 [1]. Not only is the scale of production in-
creasing but the proliferation of sophisticated techniques
is increasing. The proportion of malware able to detect
a virtual machine as their execution environment (and
change behaviour accordingly) jumped from 18% to 28%
at the beginning of 2014 [1].
This combination of increasing volume and sophisti-
cation severely threatens the scalability of conventional
malware detection methods. Human-performed reverse
engineering and analysis does not scale. Dynamic anal-
ysis does not scale well (e.g. time bombs [7] and red
pills [24]). Static analysis can be defeated (e.g. limits
imposed by opaque predicates [23]). The scalability and
accuracy of network neighbourhood analysis methods are
promising but when their dependence on specialised in-
formation in proprietary databases limits their availability
and deployability [36].
In this paper, we put forward information theoretic,
execution-agnostic, string-based similarity measures as
a scalable solution for contemporary malware detection.
Similarity must leverage ground truth but by operating
directly on strings without any pre-processing, dynamic
analysis, reverse engineering, or human intervention, we
bypass sophisticated methods of analysis resistance, lower
the human cost, and reduce the need for execution in sand-
boxes or virtual machines. Similarity measures are capa-
ble of detecting zero-day malware when it is generated
from existing malware.
Information-theoretic similarity measures, in tandem
with machine learning, can accurately, automatically, and
efficiently differentiate malware from benign-ware. They
identify patterns at a high level of abstraction and difficult
to counter by an adversary working at the assembly/source
code level (Section 6). This has the potential to be a strong
move in the malware arms race, inhibiting the current ease
of malware production.
We present ITect, which disjunctively integrates two
approaches. EnTS (Entropy Times Series) is designed
to target polymorphic malware. It extracts a simplified
signature from the amplitude and longitudinal variation
in a file’s entropy and uses this as a machine learning fea-
ture. SLaMM (Statistical Language Model for Malware
binaries) is designed to target metamorphic malware. It
builds n-gram language models over zoos of malware and
benign-ware. It then uses three different information theo-
retic metrics, cross entropy, Kullback Liebler divergence,
and mean square error, to compare a candidate file with
these models.
Surprisingly, both approaches are good at detecting all
classes of malware, not just the classes for which they
were specifically designed. For the EnTS case, we discov-
ered that metamorphic malware usually has compressed
or encrypted regions. SLaMM detects polymorphic and
packed malware by virtue of the fact that the benign-ware
model is a powerful discriminator because benign-ware
has low entropy relative to typical malware entropy (Sec-
tion 5).
In the real world, any classifier must balance precision,
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recall and accuracy. In desktop malware detection, preci-
sion is paramount. In response team malware analysis and
classification, recall is paramount. In our experiments,
we deliberately targeted 100% precision. Our methodol-
ogy can easily be inverted to target recall instead (or both
precision and recall, independently).
We road-tested ITect on a mixture of metamor-
phic, packed, and polymorphic fresh malware. Some
were taken from the Kaggle training sets, some from
VirusShare and we used an equal number of fresh benign-
ware. The joint approach achieved 100% precision and
90.3% accuracy in detection. This is better than any of the
56 VirusTotal AV engines applied to the same data, the
best of which detected the malware with 99.4% precision
and a significantly lower accuracy of 71.4%. ITect’s accu-
racy and precision remain robust when the proportion of
malware in the test set varies from 50% down to 0%. As
the proportion of malware drops, the accuracy improves
and the precision remains the same (Section 5). ITect’s
time complexity is linear in the number of files being
classified.
The major contributions of this paper are:
• We introduce ITect, a new malware detector based
on information theoretic similarity measures that
operates in linear time.
• We evaluate ITect and its components with a high
level of statistical rigour over a corpus of 30,000
malware and 2,000 benign-ware.
• We demonstrate that ITect classifies malware with
high accuracy and 100% precision, better accuracy
and precision than any VirusTotal AV engine.
2 SLaMM
Here, we present SLaMM, a novel malware classifier that
is linear and precision-optimised, two traits essential for
our target use case, the detection of desktop malware.
SLaMM is composed of three subclassifiers; it clas-
sifies the suspect P as malware when its subclassifiers
unanimously agree. Each subclassifiers compares the
similarity of the suspect program P against two program
zoos: B, populated with benign-ware, and M, with mal-
ware. We build language models to model and generalise
the information content of these zoos. For instance, these
models will capture patterns induced by the differing use
of language constructs between the two zoos, like the
frequency of NOP. Then we compare these models, and
their weighted patterns, against a suspect program.
Language models characterise, capture, and exploit
regularities in natural language. Many language models
exist; one of the simplest and most successful is the n-
gram model, which assumes that each word (or symbol)
P the suspect program to classify
qB n-gram model built from zoo of benign-ware
qM malware
P˜ the histogram of n-grams in P
q˜B the histogram of n-grams in qB
q˜M qM
Table 1: The parameters of our classifiers; below, we treat
the variables labeled with ∼ as probability distributions,
under the standard construction of a probability mass
function from a histogram.
depends only on the n−1 words that precede it. Under
the n-gram model, the probability of the word w occurring
at the i location in a sentence is
P(wi | hi)' P(wi | φ(hi)) = P(wi | wi−1i−n+1), (1)
where hi is wi’s history, the sequence of words that pre-
cedes it, and φ maps histories into equivalence classes.
The Markovian property distinguishes equivalence classes
by the most recent n−1 length suffix of that history, start-
ing from wi−n+1 up to wi’s immediate predecessor, wi−1.
We use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to ap-
proximate these probabilities. MLE assigns zero proba-
bility to n-grams that do not appear in the training data.
Smoothing takes some probability mass from n-grams ob-
served in the training data and reserves it for unobserved
n-grams; we use back-off smoothing [22].
Table 1 defines the parameters of our classifiers. By
construction, the probability mass functions built from
each histogram assume n-gram occurrence is independent.
Given the parameters in Table 1, SLaMM classifies P as
malware if its three classifiers unanimously classify P as
malware. Formally, we have
S(P,qM,qB) =CX (P,qM,qB)∧CD(P,qM,qB) (2)
∧CMSE(P,qM,qB)
where we define the classifiers CX , CD, and CMSE below.
2.1 Classifiers
Our classifiers ask “In which zoo is P more likely to be-
long?” using three different measures on different views
on our data. Our first classifier uses cross entropy to
answer the natural question “If our zoo models were pro-
gram generators, which is more likely to generate our
suspect P?”. Our second classifier considers only n-grams
without smoothing. This has the effect of making the re-
sulting token distributions formed over P and our two zoos
zero nearly everywhere, concentrating all the probability
weight on the observed tokens. We then measure their
Kullback-Leibler divergence. Our last classifier treats our
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zoos and P as signals in the unit-less signal space of prob-
abilities values and repeats the similarity question in this
space. Below, each classifier returns T if it determines P
to be malware, and F otherwise.
Cross-Entropy Classifier Cross-entropy measures the
quality of language models. Intuitively, it is the Shannon
entropy of p as “perceived” by the model q. Therefore,
a good model is one which has a low entropy, and hence
assigns a high probability to the test data. Formally, cross-
entropy is the entropy of a distribution p as estimated by
a model q:
X(p,q) =− ∑
w∈W
p(w) lg q(w). (3)
We are interested in programs, which are sequences of
words wn1 in the space of programs (i.e. a language), not a
single word w. Over a language L = {wn1 | n ∈ N∧wi ∈
W}, the cross entropy of p and q is
X(p,q) =− lim
n→∞
1
n∑wn1
p(wn1) lg q(w
n
1). (4)
For a sufficiently large n, we can approximate Equa-
tion 4 [33]:
X(p,q)≈−1
n
lg q(wn1). (5)
Given the parameters in Table 1, our cross entropy
classifier is
CX (P,qM,qB) =
{
T if X(P˜,qM)< X(P˜,qB).
F otherwise.
(6)
Consider applying CX when P is non-obfuscated
benign-ware. The control flow of P, since the triumph of
structured programming, is predictable; thus, control flow
constructs generate predictable string patterns. Malware,
however, obfuscates its control flow to prevent disassem-
bly and to hide itself behind time bombs. These obfusca-
tions induce another class of patterns in malware, viewed
as string. CX captures these different string patterns, aris-
ing from these different uses of control flow constructs,
because benign-ware’s relatively repetitive use of these
patterns will surprise qM and not qB.
Kullback-Leibler Divergence Classifier In 1951,
Kullback and Leiber [14] proposed a new way to compare
two probability distributions associated with the same
experiment. This comparison is now called Kullback-
Leibler divergence (KLD) or relative entropy. The KLD
of the distribution p from the distribution q is
D(p,q) = ∑
x∈X
p(x) lg
p(x)
q(x)
. (7)
KLD quantifies the average number of extra bits required
to encode a distribution p when using the distribution q,
which usually models p. KLD is not a metric, because it
is asymmetrical: D(p,q) 6= D(q, p), in general.
Given the parameters in Table 1, our KL classifier is
CD(P,qM,qB) =
{
T if D(P˜, q˜M)< D(P˜, q˜B)
F otherwise.
(8)
This classifier returns true when the malware model di-
verges less from the suspect P than the benign-ware model
does.
Suppose P is metamorphic malware whose code has
been produced by an obfuscation technique introducing
NOPs, which is typical junk code introduced by malware
engines. CD cares about the NOP probability mass within
P˜ even when NOPs might be captured inside some longer
n-grams. If qM has been generated by malware with
NOPs, then the mode of q˜M would be closer to NOP n-
grams than the mode of q˜B, making the two probabilities
distribution less divergent, according to KLD.
Mean Squared Error Classifier In statistical mod-
elling, mean squared error (MSE) measures difference
between the observed and predicted, or estimated, values.
In information theoretic terms, MSE measures the infor-
mation loss due to the estimator’s bias and variance. It is a
metric that measures the distance between signals. In our
case, we convert P into the probability distribution P˜, then
compare it against each zoo’s model over the signal space
of unit-less probability values between [0..1]. Given the
distributions p and q, MSE is
MSE(p,q) =
1
m∑m
(p−q)2. (9)
where m is the number of events in q.
Our zoo language models are our estimators and P˜ is
set of events we are estimating. Given the parameters in
Table 1, our MSE classifier is
CMSE(P,qM,qB) =
{
T if MSE(q˜M, P˜)< MSE(q˜B, P˜)
F otherwise.
(10)
Our MSE classifier returns true when P is closer to qM
than qB in the signal space of probability values.
CMSE captures unusual identical patterns better than
other two classifiers. An example of these patterns is
opaque predicates. Ming et al. showed that opaque pred-
icates are frequent in current malware [21]. Blackhats
could use Obfuscator-LLVM [11] to introduce opaque
predicates in the malware. Then, the opaque predicates
captured by P˜ will be closer to those captured by q˜M ,
under MSE.
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3 EnTS: Entropy Time Series Analysis
Polymorphism is a common method of disguising mal-
ware and resisting analysis. Polymorphism hides parts of
a program through encryption or packing. During execu-
tion, the relevant parts are unpacked or decrypted at need.
One side effect is variation in the entropy between differ-
ent regions of the file, creating a signal that can be used to
distinguish malware. Time series have been widely stud-
ied in the literature [5], applied in many different fields,
and have often been used for prediction. Two main ap-
proaches to their use can be distinguished: analysis of the
series trend to estimate the next value [6], and grouping
of time-series by similarity [19]. In what follows we use
the second approach to design the Entropy Time Series or
EnTS, an analysis on bit strings that targets polymorphic
malware in a scalable way.
EnTS Design We summarise the overall approach then
consider some details of the algorithm. We consider files
taken from two zoos, one of benign programs and the
other of malware. We consider each file as a stream of
chunks (fixed length segments) each with an associated
entropy value. The entropy of each chunk is calculated
from the byte frequencies for each chunk from which a
probability distribution on the bytes is calculated. We then
calculate the entropy profile, or time series, associated
with each file in the following steps.
1. Use the smaller median length of file for the two zoos
to set a fixed number of chunks, N, to be chosen from
each file.
2. Use a (Procrustean) deterministic algorithm to
choose evenly spread chunks from each file to pro-
duce a vector of N chunks in order.
3. Calculate the entropy for each chunk in the vector to
obtain an N-vector of entropies.
4. Apply a wavelet transform to obtain an N-vector of
smoothed entropies with less trivial variation.
This N-vector of smoothed entropies forms the time se-
ries for each file. We can then interpret each time series
as a coordinate in an N-dimensional space and train a
machine learning classifier to distinguish malware and
benign-ware. From now on we will use ML classifier for
the phrase machine learning classifier to avoid confusion
with general classifiers.
We discuss aspects of the algorithm in more detail. The
entropy profile of a file, F , will be computed as a Discrete
Haar wavelet Transformation (see equation 11). The Haar
wavelet requires that the number of scaling factors, N,
must be a power of 2, i.e. N = 2α for some α ∈ N.
α = dlog(min(median(Z|M),median(Z|B))/c)e
where Z|B is the benign zoo, Z|M is the malware zoo
and c is the chunk size (fixed at the beginning, see section
3). The ceiling operator produces an integer between
the two median lengths for the two zoos. Then, for each
program P in the zoos, we construct its entropy profile, F .
We first divide the file into chunks of size c.
Once we have the chunk division for a file, we need
to reduce the number of chunks to N, in order to fit the
mother wavelet, defined by:
W (N,b) =
1
|N|1/2
|C|
∑
j=1
H(C j) ·ΨHAAR
(
t j−b
N
)
. (11)
where N corresponds with the dimensions of the final
N-vector space, b is a shifting parameter, H(C j) are the
entropy values, |C| is the total number of chunks, t j is the
current chunk j in the sequence and ΨHAAR(t) is the Haar
wavelet defined by:
ΨHAAR(t) =
 1, 0≤ t < 1/2−1, 1/2≤ t < 10, otherwise (12)
The Haar wavelet is chosen because it approximates a
step function from the original function. EnTS focuses
on the variation patterns, therefore a smooth step func-
tion provides all the information it needs about the most
relevant entropy variations.
The selection process of the coefficients extracts
equidistant coefficients from the profile. The first and
last chunks have special status because file head and tail
are usually relevant parts in malware analysis. To choose
the rest of the coefficients, we calculate an increment
value inc = (|C|−1)/(N−1) to get the next chunk index
using the floor of the accumulation of this factor as the
next chosen index. For each chosen chunk we calculate
its Shannon entropy on the basis of the byte frequencies
of the chunk:
H(C j) =− ∑
b∈C j
p(b) log2 p(b),
where p(b) is the probability of byte b within the jth
chunk, C j, of program P, calculated from its frequency
count within the chunk.
Then, we calculate the discrete Haar wavelet transfor-
mation. Each iteration in the process is divided into two
parts: calculating the scale coefficients and calculating the
detail coefficients. The scale coefficients contain the most
relevant information about the signal while the detail co-
efficients contain information about the small variations.
In each iteration, the coefficients used are the scale coeffi-
cients for the previous iteration, e.g. in iteration number
2 only the scale coefficients of iteration 1 are used to cal-
culate the scale and detail coefficients of iteration 2, and
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the other wavelet coefficients are not modified. Accord-
ing to the Haar wavelet equations, a scale coefficient is
calculated by:
s1i =
1√
2
(xi+ xi+1), sαi =
1√
2
(sα−1i + s
α−1
i+1 ), α > 1,
and a detail coefficient is calculated by equations:
d1i =
1√
2
(xi− xi+1), dαi =
1√
2
(sα−1i − sα−1i+1 ), α > 1,
The scale coefficients are positioned at the beginning of
the wavelet and the detail coefficients after the scale coef-
ficients. For example, with α = 3, the iterations generate
the coefficients as follows:
(x0,x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7)
↓↑
(s10,s
1
1,s
1
2,s
1
3,d
1
0 ,d
1
1 ,d
1
2 ,d
1
3)
↓↑
(s20,s
2
1,d
2
0 ,d
2
1 ,d
1
0 ,d
1
1 ,d
1
2 ,d
1
3)
↓↑
(s30,d
3
0 ,d
2
0 ,d
2
1 ,d
1
0 ,d
1
1 ,d
1
2 ,d
1
3)
In the final iteration the wavelet, W , has been con-
structed. We can use it to reduce the noise from the
entropy time series, using a threshold, τ , on the wavelet
coefficients in this final iteration. Those values that are
below the threshold are set to 0. This process improves
the performance of the classification task by eliminating
minor variations in the original profile.
Lastly, we apply the inverse wavelet transformation to
reconstruct the entropy profile without the noise.
xi =
1√
2
(s1k +d
1
k ), s
α
k =
1√
2
(sα+1k +d
α+1
k ), α > 0
xi+1 =
1√
2
(s1k−d1k ), sαk+1 =
1√
2
(sα+1k −dα+1k ), α > 0
The resulting coefficients vary between 0 and 8 because
of the choice of chunk size and will be used as coordinates
of the entropy time series in the classification space. This
space allows the creation of scalable models based on
ml classifiers and significantly improves the speed of the
classification process. The ml classifier will infer a way
of discriminating the zoos, focused on targeting 100%
precision, that is one of our main goals.
Chunk Size Chunk size is a critical parameter for EnTS.
Chunks are file segments but we also considered sliding
windows as an alternative. This was quickly rejected
because it would add more longitudinal variation into the
entropy profile signal, not less as is the aim.
Given that the the atomic constituents of chunks are
bytes, it is easy to see that a chunk size of 256 bytes is
optimal with respect to the amplitude of entropy variation.
There are 256 = 28 possible different bytes. Entropy of
a chunk will be maximal when every possible byte has
equal probability, so the minimum chunk size that allows
the maximal possible variation in entropy (from 0 to 8
bits) is 256. On the other hand we want as many chunks as
possible in each file so we also want the length of chunks
to be as small as possible.
Example Consider a zoo of just two binary files, P and
Q, and a chunk size of c. These programs, considered
as binary strings, are divided in chunks. Suppose that
length(P) = 20c and length(Q) = 6c. Each chunk is re-
lated to a wavelet coefficient, therefore, the number of
coefficients would be 20 for P and 6 for Q. However, the
Haar wavelet requires 2α coefficients. Suppose that we
choose α = 3, then we need N = 2α = 8 coefficients. For
P we need to contract the number of chunks from 20 to 8
and for Q we need to increase the number of chunks from
6 to 8. In order to choose these chunks, we generate a
subset of the current chunks using a jump factor for each
file. The chunk index is initially set to 0, and it is incre-
mented in every step by inc1 = 19/7 = 2.71 for P and
inc2 = 5/7 = 0.71 for Q. The indices are selected using
the floor of the accumulated jump value, so the chosen
indices will be:
IP = (0,2,5,8,10,13,16,19) IQ = (0,0,1,2,2,3,4,5)
Now, for purposes of illustration, we focus on P. The
entropy of each chunk is calculated, defining an N-vector
of entropy values for each file which is considered as
an entropy time series. In order to remove noise and
simplify each time series by obtaining the reconstruction
coefficients, we apply the discrete Haar wavelet trans-
formation. Assume that the entropy values for P are
(4,5,4,1,1,2,1,2) then the wavelet transformation pro-
cess will give us:
WP|α=1 = (6.4,3.5,2.1,2.1 | −0.7,2.1,−0.7,−0.7)
WP|α=2 = (7,3 | 2,0,−0.7,2.1,−0.7,−0.7)
WP = (7 | 2.8,2,0,−0.7,2.1,−0.7,−0.7)
We apply the threshold, in this example it is 0.75, to WP
and we get WP = (7,2.8,2,0,0,2.1,0,0). Then, we apply
the reconstruction process to WP and we get the recon-
structed signal as (4.5,4.5,4,1,1.5,1.5,1.5,1.5). These
values are the coordinates of P’s profile in the space.
4 Experimental Setup
We designed our study to validate the accuracy and scala-
bility of EnTS, then SLaMM. Our classifiers are linear;
our study demonstrates their scalability. Finally, we ex-
plore how ITect combines EnTS and SLaMM, improving
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their accuracy while achieving perfect precision over our
data sets.
EnTS was designed to detect polymorphic malware.
How good it is at detecting all types of malware? RQ1:
Does EnTS accurately and precisely detect malware?
Following related work, we consider a detector to be
accurate when its accuracy is at least 90% and precise
when its precision is 100%. EnTS uses a ML classifier.
To determine how much of its performance is due to its
ML classifier and how much to its similarity metric, we
compared EnTS with other information theory similiarity
measures, using the same parameters and ML classifier
and ask RQ1.2: How does EnTS’ accuracy and precision
compare to that of other information theory similarity
measures, like NCD?
We designed SLaMM to detect metamorphic malware.
How well does it detect other types of malware? RQ2:
Does SLaMM accurately and precisely detect malware?
The scalability of our classifiers is a key contribution of
this work. We explore our scalability by asking RQ3: Do
EnTS and SLaMM scale better than NCD, CR and SE?
ITect combines SLaMM and EnTS. Does it outperform
them? RQ4: How accurately and precisely does ITect
detect malware? Finally, we ask RQ5: Can ITect improve
the results of the AV engines with 100% precision?
Data Collection We evaluate our classifiers against dif-
ferent malware concealment strategies, in particular poly-
morphism (based on compression and encryption) and
metamorphism. The datasets used have been extracted
from public repositories.
The first dataset is the Kaggle malware competition
dataset1. It contains two subsets: train and test. Kaggle’s
test subset is not labelled, so we train and test on the
train subset. It is composed of 10,869 Malware files. The
dataset contains 9 malware families whose features are
summarised in Table 2. There are two files per malware:
a byte representation (hexdump) and an asm file with IDA
Pro information from the disassembly process. We used
xdd2 to convert the hexdumps to binary executables. This
dataset was published February 2015.
We collected packed malware from VirusShare3.
We desired Win32 malware whose packing system was
known, so we focused on the first malware set of
VirusShare, uploaded in June 2012. This database is
composed of approximately 112,000 Malware files. By
combining Yara4 with packer rules extracted from the
YaraRules project5 and information from VirusTotal6
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classification
2http://linux.about.com/library/cmd/blcmdl1 xxd.htm
3http://virusshare.com
4http://yara.readthedocs.org
5http://yararules.com/
6https://www.virustotal.com/
Class Instances EnTS SLaMM Conc. Type
Ramnit 1541 1418 400 Poly Worm
Lollipop 2478 2279 400 Poly Adware
Kelihos 3 2942 2716 400 Poly Botnet
Vundo 475 440 475 Meta Trojan
Simda 42 37 0 Poly Botnet
Tracur 751 687 400 Poly Trojan
Kelihos 1 398 360 0 Encr Botnet
Obf.ACY 1228 1127 1228 Meta Trojan
Gatak 1013 936 400 Poly Trojan
Total 10868 10000 3703
Table 2: Information about Kaggle classes:number of
instances, instances used in EnTS and SLaMM’s experi-
ments, concealment strategies and types of malware.
Packer Samples 1 Samples 2 Samples 3 SLaMM
Armadillo 37 41 42 78
ASPack 58 64 58 122
ASProtect 16 19 21 35
Borland 261 251 229 512
NET 57 88 106 145
PECompact 47 46 47 93
UPX 268 266 265 534
Rest 256 225 232 481
Table 3: Information about VirusShare packers: number
of instances in EnTS samples, and instances in SLaMM
experiments.
we extracted 3,000 Win32 malware with known pack-
ers. Around 70 specific packing systems were detected
by Yara, however, several of them came from the same
family, so we focused on the most frequently occurring
families (see Table 3).
We synthesised a mixed dataset by sampling: roughly
1/3 from Polymorphic data (Kaggle), 1/3 from Metamor-
phic (Kaggle) and 1/3 from Packed. The resulting dataset
has 2,000 malware instances. In industry, white hats often
must analyse different kinds of malware at the same time.
This dataset aims to emulate this scenario. Finally, we
collected 2,000 benign files from Windows OS.
To generate data for EnTS, we uniformly sampled
10,000 files from the Kaggle dataset without replacement
and randomly divided it into five equal sets. We uniformly
divided the (packed) files from the VirusShare dataset into
three groups of 1,000 (See Tables 2 and 3).
SLaMM trains different language models for each cate-
gory of malware (polymorphic, metamorphic and packed)
and one for benign-ware, then compares any candidate file
with each of the four models. So for SLaMM we chose
different malware sets from files labelled metamorphic,
polymorphic and packed (see Tables 2 and 3).
Algorithms and Parameters The evaluation consists
of four main steps. The first is data selection. In every
experiment we have chosen the same number of malware
and benign-ware instances. The training data consists
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of two thirds of the instances and the remaining third
comprises the test data. The test data is always fresh data
for either approach and is randomly selected by uniform
sampling at the beginning of the process. The second step
consists of search space generation for classification in
EnTS or n-gram counting for construction the language
models. Once these are prepared, we train a classifier or
construct a language model as appropriate. Finally, we
evaluate malware detection on the test set, recording the
accuracy and the false positive rate.
EnTS EnTS applies machine learning to entropy pro-
files. To compare against EnTS, we implemented three
other information theoretic features of binary strings from
the literature. The first is the compression rate (CR)
which calculates the ratio of the compressed length to
the uncompressed length for a given file compressor and
is related to the Kolmogorov complexity of the specific
file [16]. We chose LZMA2 as the compressor and its
maximum compression parameters and the maximum
windows size, i.e., 4GB, using the package 7zip .
The second is the Normalised Compression Distance
(NCD), which approximates the Normalised Information
Distance [16], a universal, generic, information theoretic
metric. Formally, NCD is
NCD(P,Q) =
C(PQ)−min{C(P),C(Q)}
max{C(P),C(Q)} ,
where P,Q are strings, PQ is their concatenation, and C(·)
is the compressed size function for a specified compressor.
NCD also uses LZMA2 as the compressor.
Finally, we compare against Structural Entropy (SE).
Sorokin introduced this technique in 2011 [31] and Baysa
et al. applied it to metamorphic malware in 2013 [4]. It
divides a file into chunks, calculates the entropy of each
chunk, then groups the chunks into arbitrarily sized seg-
ments (the information for each segment is its average
entropy and its size). It generates a similarity matrix,
performing a pairwise comparison on the files based on
Levenshtein distance. This approach is O(n2), where n is
the number of files. Further, the variable number and vari-
able size of segments in a file means this approach may
determine a file with more segments to be totally different
from another file with fewer segments even though the
overall entropy pattern in the two files is similar. EnTS
escapes this problem: it extracts an fixed length entropy
time series from a file as a token stream and operates
directly on this time series and therefore all of the file’s
information at once. The parameters chosen for this com-
parison are the same as those used in both Baysa and
Sorokin’s work: τ = 0.3, cε = 0.6 and cα = 1.4.
The parameters for EnTS are: the chunk size is 256,
N = 512 elements (29) because the smaller zoo (packed
files) has an average size of 116 KB, the threshold is 0.5,
and α = dlog(116 ·210/28)e= 9.
The algorithms used for classification have been taken
from the classification literature. In order to improve the
learning process, we have used a multiple-learners ap-
proach, where different classifiers are combined in order
to divide the learning process, specialising different re-
gions of the space. The multiple learning approach used
here is Random Forest7 with 100 trees. This method
uses voting to combine different classifiers. The base
classifiers chosen are Inference Trees8 classifiers. These
are useful for incrementing the accuracy and increasing
the precision, because they penalise false positives dur-
ing construction [8]. By combining these two methods,
we construct, as the results show, a competitive classi-
fier/detector in each case that optimally finds the boundary
between malware and benign-ware for each measure.
SLaMM For SLaMM, we train four different n-gram
language models (polymorphic, metamorphic, packed,
and benign). The only parameter is the size of the n-gram,
i.e. n. We chose a tri-gram (n=3) language model for each
corpus to strike a balance between memory use and pro-
viding sufficient information to produce good results. To
extract n-grams from our zoos and suspect programs, we
cut each program’s hexdump into overlapping substrings
of length n.
5 Experimental Analysis
This section starts evaluating EnTS, follows with SLaMM
and analyse their scalability. It concludes evaluating the
ITect, as the combination of both.
EnTS Evaluation NCD and SE generate a similarity
matrix while EnTS and CR describe point coordinates
for the profiles and the compression rate, respectively.
Applying machine learning to EnTS and CR is straight-
forward because we have the points and we only need to
discriminate them. For NCD and SE we consider each
row of the training similarity matrix as coordinates, due
to the number of files is fixed. This provides the points
that the machine learning algorithm uses. For testing, we
will consider the coordinates as the similarities among
the test files and the training files. The machine learning
algorithms chosen are non-deterministic approaches (they
choose a random seed during the initialization process),
then, we need to generate different models to measure
their median performance [8]. Hence, each experiment
7https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/party/
index.html
8https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/party/
index.html
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Data NCD CR SE EnTS
Kag 1 H93.7 ± 0.5 H78.5 ± 0.5 H87.3 ± 0.6 95.1 ± 0.2
Kag 2 H92.1 ± 0.6 H80.0 ± 0.2 H88.9 ± 0.4 94.4 ± 0.3
Kag 3 H93.2 ± 0.6 H80.0 ± 0.4 H90.2 ± 0.6 94.3 ± 0.3
Kag 4 N94.7 ± 0.5 H80.2 ± 0.3 H88.8 ± 0.5 94.1 ± 0.2
Kag 5 H92.8 ± 0.6 H77.7 ± 0.4 H87.7 ± 0.6 95.2 ± 0.2
Pck 1 N90.5 ± 0.5 H71.3 ± 0.8 H82.4 ± 0.8 87.2 ± 0.5
Pck 2 N88.6 ± 0.5 H71.3 ± 0.2 H80.6 ± 1.3 86.2 ± 0.5
Pck 3 88.4 ± 0.5 H71.5 ± 0.4 H82.8 ± 0.6 88.4 ± 0.4
Mixed N93.5 ± 0.5 H73.9 ± 0.3 H85.4 ± 0.7 89.1 ± 0.4
Table 4: Accuracy Results for all datasets and techniques.
The best results are remarked in bold. The second best
results are remarked in italic. The Nand Hsymbols indi-
cate whether a technique is statistically better or worse to
EnTS respectively, according to Wilcoxon test.
has been carried out 100 times, and the median and stan-
dard deviation has been provided to compare the results.
Furthermore, in order to compare different algorithms,
we have applied the Wilcoxon test to evaluate whether
there is statistical significance among the results or not.
We consider that there is statistical significance when the
p value is less than 0.05 using EnTS as benchmark. In
order to reduce the redundancy of correlated variables in
the space, we have eliminated those dimensions whose
Pearson correlation was higher than 0.8 with respect to
other dimension. This reduces the space to the 5% of the
original dimension.
Table 4 shows the direct comparison between the four
techniques discriminating malware and benign-ware, ac-
cording to the accuracy. It divides the results by technique
and provides the accuracy of applying each algorithm to
the specific datasets described in section 4. For Kaggle
data, EnTS and NCD generally obtain the best results
(EnTS is over 94% of accuracy in all cases and NCD over
92%). SE is always worse than these techniques and CR
is the worst approach. For VirusShare or packed data,
all techniques reduce their accuracy, however, EnTS and
NCD keeps competitive results compare with the rest of
the techniques (over 86% and 88% in all cases). These
results might be affected by similar packing systems used
by malware and benign-ware. The mixed data shows that
NCD obtains the best results followed by EnTS (93.5%
and 89.1% of accuracy, respectively). SE obtains similar
results than in the previous case and CR is the worst tech-
nique. This analysis shows that EnTS and NCD are the
best techniques classifying malware.
Increment precision is equivalent to reduce false pos-
itives. The ml classifier penalizes false positives during
the learning process, as was mention above, to ensure that
the model generates a good diagnosis of the malicious
programs. The cut-off or threshold used in the ROC curve
also provides a confidence value in the random forest vot-
ing system that helps to reduce false positives. Using 10
cross-fold validation in the training set, we set the cut-off
0 0.002 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15
Kaggle 1 NCD 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.98 0.99 1.00
Kaggle 1 CR 0.23 0.30 0.32 0.50 0.61 0.72
Kaggle 1 SE 0.42 0.52 0.66 0.81 0.86 0.90
Kaggle 1 EnTS 0.78 0.85 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.99
Kaggle 2 NCD 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.98 0.99 0.99
Kaggle 2 CR 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.53 0.64 0.73
Kaggle 2 SE 0.44 0.45 0.58 0.82 0.88 0.89
Kaggle 2 EnTS 0.80 0.80 0.88 0.95 0.97 0.98
Kaggle 3 NCD 0.70 0.72 0.81 0.97 0.99 0.99
Kaggle 3 CR 0.27 0.32 0.34 0.58 0.68 0.74
Kaggle 3 SE 0.42 0.56 0.65 0.84 0.91 0.93
Kaggle 3 EnTS 0.78 0.84 0.90 0.95 0.96 0.98
Kaggle 4 NCD 0.73 0.76 0.87 0.99 1.00 1.00
Kaggle 4 CR 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.53 0.65 0.76
Kaggle 4 SE 0.42 0.51 0.68 0.82 0.88 0.91
Kaggle 4 EnTS 0.77 0.80 0.88 0.94 0.96 0.98
Kaggle 5 NCD 0.79 0.82 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.99
Kaggle 5 CR 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.51 0.65 0.71
Kaggle 5 SE 0.36 0.41 0.64 0.82 0.84 0.88
Kaggle 5 EnTS 0.79 0.82 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.99
Packed 1 NCD 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.92 0.96 0.96
Packed 1 CR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.53 0.56
Packed 1 SE 0.09 0.09 0.44 0.69 0.77 0.80
Packed 1 EnTS 0.26 0.26 0.44 0.76 0.83 0.90
Packed 2 NCD 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.84 0.88 0.92
Packed 2 CR 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.30 0.53 0.61
Packed 2 SE 0.11 0.11 0.35 0.66 0.74 0.75
Packed 2 EnTS 0.26 0.26 0.44 0.69 0.80 0.92
Packed 3 NCD 0.13 0.13 0.29 0.83 0.89 0.92
Packed 3 CR 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.27 0.53 0.62
Packed 3 SE 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.68 0.74 0.82
Packed 3 EnTS 0.28 0.28 0.44 0.75 0.87 0.92
Mixed NCD 0.52 0.60 0.82 0.92 0.95 0.98
Mixed CR 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.42 0.53 0.61
Mixed SE 0.11 0.26 0.52 0.78 0.82 0.85
Mixed EnTS 0.35 0.45 0.69 0.82 0.88 0.91
Table 5: False positives and true positives rates for all
techniques and datasets. The ROC curve that has been
chosen is the median of all the ROC curves generated
during the experimental process.
to the most conservative value, i.e. the one that ensures 0
false positives in all validation sets, and we apply this last
model to the test data.
Table 5 shows the median results for the ROC curves
for all the experiments. In this table, we can see how the
threshold variation modifies the true/false positives rates
for each dataset. For Kaggle data, EnTS detects more
than the 77% of malware with 100% precision (i.e. 0
false positive) and NCD detects 69%. SE only detects,
at most, 44%. For packed malware, EnTS detection rate
is reduced to 26-28%, NCD to 6-13%, SE to 11% and
CR to 0%. For mixed data, NCD improves its results
significantly (52%), as well as EnTS (35%). CR is also
incremented (17%). This table has shown that EnTS
outperforms all techniques with 100% precision. These
results also discard CR as a classifier. After setting the
threshold to the 100% precision, the median accuracy
achieved by EnTS for Kaggle data is 89% ± 5.7, for
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Class NCD CR SE EnTS
Armadillo N95.9±1.9 H82.4±2.9 H85.1±2.5 89.2±3.5
ASPack N85.7±11 42.9±15 42.9±7.3 42.9±14
ASProtect N100±1.9 H95.2±2.4 95.8±3.1 95.8±2.5
Borland 100±0.0 100±5.3 100±2.3 100±3.7
NET N100±0.9 H53.8±5.1 H73.1±3.0 96.2±3.1
PEComp N83.9±11 H45.2±11 50.0±5.6 50.0±7.5
UPX N100±1.1 95.2±3.9 H91.3±3.5 95.7±2.2
Rest N97.7±1.5 H83.7±6.3 93.0±3.2 92.3±4.4
Ramnit H57.9±6.4 H71.8±4.5 H52.1±5.2 84.7±4.2
Lollipop 97.1±1.4 H55.3±5.9 H84.8±2.0 97.0±1.2
Kelihos3 100±0.2 99.4±1.1 100±0.2 100±0.0
Vundo H72.4±12 H86.2±8.0 100±2.7 100±1.6
Simda 100±0.0 H50.0±38 H75.0±22 100±4.0
Tracur H95.7±2.6 H90.0±5.9 H93.5±4.6 100±1.1
Kelihos1 N96.0±4.2 H91.7±11 N96.0±4.0 95.0±5.0
Obf.ACY H80.8±4.3 H53.2±11 H68.5±4.5 91.9±2.2
Gatak H91.3±4.1 H83.1±5.0 N98.6±1.3 94.6±2.4
Poly N97.3±0.6 H74.2±0.6 H83.4±1.1 93.3±0.5
Meta H94.1±0.8 H80.1±0.6 H86.4±1.0 94.6±0.7
Packed N80.2±2.6 H67.1±0.6 N75.7±1.0 73.4±1.1
Table 6: Breakdown of Table 4 results by: malware fami-
lies in Kaggle dataset, packing systems in packed dataset
and concealment strategy in mixed dataset.
packed data is 63% ± 5.8 and for mixed data is 66.2% ±
2.1. The mixed data model will be used for ITect.
Finally, we want to go deeper in the specific conceal-
ment strategies used by the families and packing systems
and how they affect the performance of each technique.
Table 6 breakdowns the results from Table 4 in families,
packing systems and strategies for Kaggle, VirusShare
and mixed data, respectively. For packed malware, NCD
achieves the best performance in all cases, followed by
EnTS. All techniques are good discriminating Borland
system, as well as ASProtect and UPX. For Kaggle fam-
ilies, we can see that NCD and EnTS outperforms the
rest of techniques in almost all cases. This also shows the
effectiveness of EnTS when it is applied to metamorphic
malware. Due to metamorphic malware has not intuitive
entropy variations we focus on the two specific families:
Vundo and Obfuscator.ACY. Vundo was previously stud-
ied by Li et al., who provided a description about the
metamorphic engine [18]. This description mentions that
the data section is encrypted or compressed, therefore this
produces entropy variations that can be detected by EnTS.
This fact is also detected in the entropy profile, where
there are long sections with higher entropy than others.
For Obfuscator.ACY the previous pattern is also frequent
in the entropy profile, but in smaller sections, probably
related to encrypted or compressed strings. These varia-
tion patterns make the metamorphic data totally unique
for EnTS, and it is the reason it can easily detect them.
For mixed data, the best results are for polymorphic and
metamorphic data, applying NCD and EnTS. For packed,
NCD is the best, followed, in this case, by SE which is
close to EnTS.
Research question 1 asks whether EnTS is accurate and
precise. It is precise: it obtains 100% precision. However,
it falls short of the 90% accuracy bar. It obtains 89%
accuracy on Kaggle, 66.2% on mixed data and 63% on
packed. This motivates ITect, which combines SLaMM
and EnTS.
Research question 1.2 asks about comparing EnTS with
the other techniques. EnTS is more accurate than CR and
SE and similar to NCD. These results show that NCD and
EnTS are competitive classifiers in all cases. CR does not
provide any relevant information to the system and EnTS
easily defeats SE. Besides, EnTS and NCD can handle
specific families and packers, forcing malware writers to
create new ones.
SLaMM evaluation Table 7 reports the classification
accuracies and false positive rates for SLaMM in terms of
the three classifiers for different malware dataset, namely
metamorphic, polymorphic and packed. For metamorphic
and polymorphic malware, CD achieves the best accuracy,
94.7% and 83.4%, respectively. Whereas CMSE has the
best detection accuracy for packed malware, 86.1%. In
terms of false positive rates, the performance of CX is
notable as it has the lowest false positive rate for all three
different malware datasets. The accuracy and false pos-
itive rates of SLaMM, highlighted in bold, depends on
individual classifiers. Interestingly, SLaMM has the best
accuracy for metamorphic malware and it has the lowest
false positive rate for polymorphic. SLaMM achieves a
relatively good average accuracy of 72% with sufficiently
low average false positive 0.027.
Cat. Accuracy False Positive
CD CMSE CX SLaMM CD CMSE CX SLaMM
Meta 94.7 89.1 79.9 76.1 0.052 0.013 0.01 0.011
Poly 83.4 75.0 70.1 67.2 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.0
Pkd 83.7 86.1 85.1 73.6 0.118 0.232 0.077 0.07
Avg. 88.2 83.4 78.4 72.3 0.061 0.082 0.029 0.027
Table 7: Detection Accuracy and False Positive Rate Com-
parison of 3 classifiers with different malware categories.
SLaMM can use different configurations for the mal-
ware language models and, in order to improve the quality
ratios, we have combined the three malware language
models of previous sections using the classifiers. This
combination helps to detect specific malware that can be
detected by a language model and not for other. For ex-
ample, for metamorphic malware, the opaque invariants
would be detected by the metamorphic engine and for
packed malware, specific details like the 3-gram signature
of UPX packer would be detected by the packed language
model. The combination is performed as follows: for
reconstruct each classifier as the OR of the equivalent
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NCD CR SE EnTS
Kaggle Space Gen >5days 60m 140m 5m
Kaggle Classification 320m 3m 300m 4m
Kaggle Total >5days 63m 440m 9m
Packed Space Gen >2days 40m 90m 3m
Packed Classifications 31m 1m 32m 2m
Packed Total >2days 41m 122m 5m
Mixed Space Gen >5days 60m 140m 5m
Mixed Classification 320m 3m 300m 4m
Mixed Total >5days 63m 440m 9m
Table 8: Average time results for the different methods
and all the databases. Time is approximated in minutes
(m) and days.
classifiers in each language model. After, we perform the
AND operation among the different classifiers. Using this
new configuration, SLaMM achieves 82.1% of accuracy
with 0 FP for the mixed dataset.
Research question 2 asks whether SLaMM is accurate and
precise. It is precise: it obtains 100% precision. However,
it fails in the accuracy. The accuracy of SLaMM is 82.1%
on the mixed data. This also motivates ITect.
Scalability Table 8 shows the average time consump-
tion of the techniques for training and testing. The table
is divided in three datasets (Kaggle, packed and mixed),
and three specific values: the space generation or train-
ing (where the algorithms generate the similarity matri-
ces, entropy profiles or the compressibility values), the
classification process and the total average time. EnTS
outperforms every single technique. We can also see that
NCD is the most impractical technique, taking 2 days in
the best case and 5 in the worse. This shows that NCD
is not optimal for malware detection. It is a consequence
of the file compression and the pairwise comparison to
generate the similarity matrix. The compression process
also affects to CR which needs more time to calculate the
ratios. The pairwise comparison affects to NCD and SE.
EnTS uses no pairwise comparison, and this improves the
time consumption. Besides, the entropy profile generation
and the wavelet decomposition are linear processes, they
do not generate a bottleneck during the analysis.
The memory consumption of each metric grows de-
pending on the space size. For NCD and SE, this space
is related to the similarity matrix, which grows as O(P2)
while EnTS grows linearly O(P) according to the num-
ber of programs, P, due to the number of coefficients (or
coordinates) used in the space is fixed. CR also grows
linearly according to the number of files.
Table 9 shows computation time and memory consump-
tion for SLaMM. The time consumption depends on two
factors, the order of n-gram language model and the size
of the corpus in terms of individual file size. The model
size increases exponentially when the n-gram order be-
comes higher. However, models can be generated in paral-
lel. Therefore, the time of the whole system corresponds
to the longest language model generation process. For in-
stance, SLaMM finishes the whole classification process
including, pre-processing, 3-gram LM construction for
each malware dataset, LM look up and detection in 93
minutes (detection takes 23 minutes using all classifiers).
On the other hand the memory consumption does not
depend of the corpus size or individual file size in the cor-
pus. It only depends on the order of the language model.
SLaMM occupied 273M of RAM during classification
and it remains unchanged for each dataset.
The time consumption ranking for the techniques and
for datasets containing 2000 malware and 2000 benign-
ware starts with NCD consuming more than five days.
It follows with SE consuming 440 minutes, SLaMM
consuming 116 minutes, CR consuming 63 minutes and
finally EnTS consuming only 9 minutes. The equiva-
lent memory consumption ranking starts with NCD and
SE consuming consuming a big square similarity matrix
(O(P2)). It follows with SLaMM (depending on the value
of n in n-grams) and EnTS and CR as O(P) techniques.
Malware Time Memory
Metamorphic 53m 273M
Polymorphic 71m 273M
Packed 45m 273M
Benign 93m 273M
Table 9: Time and memory consumption of SLaMM with
3-gram LM
Research question 3 asks whether SLaMM and EnTS
scale better than NCD, SE and CR. They do scale bet-
ter and are linear scalable, but in the case of SLaMM
compared with CR.
ITect Evaluation In order to evaluate how EnTS and
SLaMM complement each other for classification, we
have chosen the mixed dataset, which is the most hetero-
geneous. The combination is a simple OR, named ITect.
The test results for the mixed dataset using ITect are:
90.3% ± 0.79 of accuracy and 0 false positives. In real
environments, it is more frequent to find benign-ware than
malware, then we have designed an experiment changing
the balance between them. We set the number of malware
instances as a percentage starting from 0% to 50%. We
apply ITect to measure the false positives rate and the
accuracy.
Figure 1 shows the results. The precision keeps con-
stant in 100% (as the false positives are 0), therefore no
benign-ware is detected as malware. The accuracy starts
with a 100%, and it goes down when some malware is
not detected (false negatives). It linearly goes down un-
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Figure 1: Accuracy and False Positive Rate for ITect. This
is the median results for 100 experiments modifying the
percentages of malware from 0 to 50% of the total data.
til achieving 94.6% of accuracy with 50% of malware
programs.
To provide an intuition about recall instead of precision,
it is easy to deduce that it goes down with the accuracy.
The accuracy is defined by (T P+T N)/(T P+T N+FP+
FN), then, when the FP is constant and 0, it means that
the accuracy and the FN are inversely proportional. Due
to recall depends on the T P and FN, it means it goes
down. However, during the construction process, we
might change the penalization factor from FP to FN, if
we want to increment the recall (which might be interest-
ing for other kind of analysis), but reduce both values (i.e.
FP and FN) supposes to increment the accuracy, which
is more challenging.
We have also perform a sanity check using benign-
ware and malware downloaded from download.com and
VirusShare, respectively, dated on January 2016. We have
download 10 malware and 10 benign-ware. All techniques
were able to identify all the benign-ware. EnTS identified
5 of the malware files while SLaMM identified 6. ITect
identified 8 malware files with 100% precision.
Research question 4 asks whether ITect is accurate and
precise. It is accurate and precise. ITect classifies mal-
ware with 90.3% of accuracy and 100% of precision,
providing a competitive wait to detect malware.
Comparing ITect with AV Engines We have com-
pared ITect with 56 Anti-Virus Engines. For this compar-
ison, we have sent all the test set from the mixed dataset
to Virus Total. In the case of packed malware, all the data
was already classified as Malware using this system, but
Kaggle data is fresher and there are a few anti-virus that
can detect it. Table 10 shows the comparison between
the best and worst engines related to accuracy and pre-
cision. We can see that SLaMM and EnTS obtain the
best accuracy results with 100% precision. Avast accu-
Technique ACC Precision
Best AV with 0 FP ESET-NOD32 65.6% 100.0%
More Accurate AV Avast 71.4% 99.4%
AV with higher FPs Emsisoft 64.9% 97.2%
AV with worst Accuracy Zoner 50.8% 100.0%
SLaMM 82.1% 100.0%
EnTS 66.2% 100.0%
ITect 90.3% 100.0%
Table 10: Comparison between Anti-Virus Engines,
EnTS, SLaMM and ITect, according to precision and
accuracy.
racy is higher than EnTS, but its is penalized by the false
positives. ITect outperforms all the system achieving an
accuracy of more than 90% with 100% precision.
Research question 5 asks about ITect performance com-
pared with the 56 AV Engines from VirusTotal. ITect
outperforms all AV Engines with 100% of precision. Be-
sides, it is almost 20 points higher than the most accurate
AV Engine.
6 Countermeasures
As a move (or moves) in the arms race we need to consider
possible countermeasures. Our moves are useful if it is
difficult for the opponents to counter them, even if it is
possible to counter them.
EnTS First consider EnTS. Opponents can attempt to
modify polymorphic malware so that the entropy profile
is closer to that of benign programs. The evidence from
our experiments is that benign programs typically have an
entropy profile which is smooth, i.e. with low variation,
and which has an average entropy which is lower than
that of polymorphic malware.
Clearly, to evade EnTS, opponents need to ensure that
the average entropy of an EnTS chunk is lower and that
the overall variation is lower. To achieve this they need to
add in low entropy material within each chunk. (Adding
material in amounts longer than a chunk can reduce the
average variability but fails to evade EnTS as it simply per-
petuates the existing malware entropy profile by adding
more low entropy regions that contrast with the existing
high entropy ones). Adding low entropy material to each
high entropy chunk will definitely have a smoothing ef-
fect on the variability but it is problematic with respect
to achieving an average entropy over the chunks which is
similar to the average entropy of benign-ware. To bring
down the overall chunk average the entropy of the added
material must be lower than the average chunk entropy of
the benign-ware. The risk to the opponent is that it is not
possible to do this and still look like benign code. The
measure of the opponent’s ability to do this is in some
11
Semantically
equilavent
to M
Statistical
profiled
benign
programs
Programs
·M
Figure 2: Semantic space for malware and benign-ware.
sense the measure of any gap between the representative-
ness of the benign-ware zoo used to construct the average
chunk entropy and benign-ware at large.
Let O be the average entropy of the material that the
opponent needs to add, M be the average entropy of the
benign-ware, and N be the average entropy of the poly-
morphic malware. Then O≤M ≤ N. Consider a chunk
and let n be the number of chunks of low entropy material
that need to be added to the malware to achieve an aver-
age chunk entropy of M. Then for a single high entropy
chunk the opponent requires
N+nO
n+1
= M, i.e. n =
N−M
M−O
The number, n, of additional chunks worth of material to
be added for each chunk of packed/encrypted material is
given by the ratio N−MM−O . Clearly when O is close to M
(and we have argued above that it must be) this number is
very large, a threat to the viability of the malware, and the
desired outcome is impossible to achieve in the case that
the benign zoo is highly representative of the entire benign
program population – as then O must be very close to M
and the amount of material to add becomes infeasible.
SLaMM Now consider SLaMM. The strength of
SLaMM is that we construct a highly accurate, fine-
grained, statistical model of benign-ware and use infor-
mation theory to measure divergence from that model
relative to a malware model. In order to evade detection it
is no longer enough for the opponent to metamorphically
produce a semantically equivalent malware. It now must
also have the statistical profile of benign programs. The
first point to make is that SLaMM shrinks the available
space into which any program can be metamorphosed, as
illustrated in figure 2
The second point to make is that guaranteeing the sta-
tistical profile of the binary is a novel and non-trivial
exercise. Imagine the opponent writing malware source
code from scratch. There is the crap-shoot approach. If
it is sufficiently novel and different to both existing mod-
els it may fortunately be more different to the malware
zoo than to the benign-ware zoo. Or there is the benign
model aware approach. She needs an IDE with a built-in
interpreter and an analyser that constantly checks the sta-
tistical profile of the low-level code. The editor perhaps
starts with the source code blue for “cool” or “OK” and
as the low-level code deviates from the required statistical
profile, gradually turns the colour to red. As there is a
level of indirection and no obvious guidelines, once the
code turns red it is not clear what to do. Delete recent
sections? start again?
Alternatively, she could turn to search-based software
engineering and use genetic program improvement (GI) to
search for an equivalent program to an existing malware
with the right statistical profile [15]. As argued above we
have shrunken the space of equivalent programs. Then,
maintaining program equivalence is difficult in this arena
unless she restricts the search space to that defined by
semantics preserving local transformations, an approach
deprecated in the GI community as too restrictive. In
addition, although it may be straightforward to define a
fitness function, it is not clear until someone tries this in
anger that the resulting fitness landscape has a gradient
that allows the search to succeed.
7 Related Work
We touch upon the problems with the state of the art
in malware analysis, the growing usefulness of network
association metrics, and then review byte level content
analysis as a detection technique.
Detection via Byte Level Content In 1994 Kephart
presented an n-gram approach for extracting signatures
but reported no results [12]. In 2001, Schultz et al. used
several data mining techniques on binaries to distinguish
between benign and malicious executables in Windows
or MS-DOS format. Memory consumption was a scala-
bility bottleneck. They experimented on a dataset of 3265
malware and 1001 benign files but lacked fresh data for
testing. Validation achieved 97.11% Accuracy with 3.8%
FP rate [30].
In 2006, Kolter and Maloof used Information Gain
combined with byte level analysis of n-grams to classify
and detect malware. Again they did not use fresh data for
the test phase. They experimented on two small datasets,
one of 476 malware, 561 benign-ware (95% accuracy with
5% FP in validation); the second of 1971 benign-ware,
1651 malware (94% accuracy and 1% FP in validation)
[13].
In 2007, Lyda and Hamrock used the average entropy
of a whole file and the entropy of specific code sections
(discovered only by using static analysis). They showed
that binary files with a higher entropy score tend to be
correlated with the presence of encryption or compres-
sion. They compared more than 20,000 malware to check
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whether they are able to detect these concealment methods
but did not consider malware detection [20]. In the same
year, Stolfo et al used 1-gram and 2-gram byte distribu-
tions for a file to compare it with different filetype models
for filetype identification [17] in malware detection within
DOC and PDF files. They reported on experiments with
over 140 pdfs and 361 benign and 616 malware and re-
sults with between 3% to 20% of false positives but no
accuracy information. This work considered n-grams in
a vector space, using their frequency and variation as
features, but each dimension was a n-gram resulting in
exponential increase in the number of dimensions [32].
Tabish et al. in 2009 divided files into blocks, and cal-
culated frequency of n-gram histograms for each block,
then extracted statistical and information-theoretic fea-
tures from the histogram to define a feature vector per
block. They used this to classify a feature vector as normal
or potentially malicious. Pairwise comparison between
blocks of different files reduces the scalability of this ap-
proach. They claimed an accuracy rate of 90% with a
False Positive rate of around 10% [34].
Santos et al. in 2011 introduced a semi-supervised
methodology to reduce the labelling process. Their n-
gram vector was the frequency of all possible n-grams,
an important scalability limitation. After experiments on
1000 malware and benign-ware, they reported 89% of
accuracy with 10% of false positives [29].
Our work work has three advantages over previous
work in detection via byte level content: (1) better accu-
racy combined with lower false positive rates, (2) better
(linear) scalability in the detection phase, and (3) a more
rigorous experimental approach.
Other Detection Methods Windows malware has be-
come increasingly sophisticated at hiding itself and resist-
ing analysis. Android malware currently lags behind this
level of sophistication.
Static analysis, whether based on abstractions of Con-
trol Flow Graphs and program semantics [26] or on op-
code analysis [27], or focused on PE Headers and Static
API Calls [37, 38] as features for machine learning, faces
the increasing difficulty of initial reverse engineering. In
addition, Moser et al. demonstrated hard limits to the
ability of static anaysis to deal with obfuscation [23]. Dy-
namic analysis via virtual machines and sandboxes can
avoid anti-disassembly measures but suffer from resis-
tance via dynamic defence predicates and red pill envi-
ronment detection techniques [25]. Windows malware
analysis aiming to integrate dynamic and static analysis,
as [28] [10] [2], to produce features for data mining
approaches suffer the same problems.
Recent approaches to Android malware exploit the rel-
ative lack of sophistication of that type of malware. These
include Drebin [3], CopperDroid [35], which combine
machine learning with behavioural models. Other tools
as DroidSIFT [39] are focused on anomaly detection and
malware family classification.
Malware detection tools focused on network neighbour-
hoods, for example, Nazca [9] and AESOP [36] show real
promise in terms of scale and accuracy but require ground
truth as a seed, just as our similarity techniques do.
8 Conclusions
ITect opens a new front in the arms race. Its level of ab-
straction makes it difficult to counter and it offers scalabil-
ity advantages. We have demonstrated excellent precision
and accuracy on a representative mixture of malware types
drawn from the Kaggle malware data and VirusShare. We
have demonstrated that both of its constituent detectors,
EnTS and SLaMM, outperform previous information the-
oretic similarity measures. Indeed, ITect outperforms
existing AntiVirus engines (as represented in VirusTo-
tal) for accuracy and precision. Its time complexity is
bounded above by the number of files to be classified. As
an automated, execution agnostic, string-based similarity
metric it offers wider scalability advantages beyond its
time complexity class alone – reducing human effort and
reducing the need for dynamic or static analysis.
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